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Analysis : Middle
East : Iraq
Iraq: US occupation faces crisis of its own making
By James Cogan
21 February 2008
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The much-touted successes of the Bush administrations
deployment of 30,000 American additional troops to Iraq last year
rest on unstable and rapidly eroding foundations. The unstated
fear in the Pentagon debate over how many American troops can
be withdrawn this year is that the policies associated with the
surge have created potential triggers for a return to wide-spread
resistance.
Three laws passed by the Iraqi parliament on February 13 embody
the looming crisis. The legislation consisted of the governments
2008 budget, an amnesty for thousands of Sunnis who have been
detained during counter-insurgency operations and, finally, the
definition of the power-sharing arrangements between the federal
government in Baghdad and provincial authorities and the naming
of October 1 as the date for long-overdue provincial elections.
In January, a law was enacted that went some way toward lifting
US-imposed restrictions on political activities by former members
of the Sunni-dominated Baath Party of former dictator Saddam Hussein.
US ambassador in Iraq Ryan Crocker hailed the bills passage
as important steps forward. The parliament, he declared,
deserves congratulations from all of us. The truth
is that the legislation was accepted only because of intense pressure
on a number of major factions in the Iraqi establishment to accept
a curtailment of their ambitions. In many cases, political groupings
have been compelled to accept policies that fail to meet the guarantees
they were given by US officials and officers in exchange for cooperating
with the occupation.
The Sunni establishment, which has suffered the greatest losses
of power and privilege under US occupation, has been left with
an array of grievances. The de-Baathification law still bars former
Baathists from holding positions in security ministries. The military
and police remain firmly under the influence of the Shiite fundamentalist
parties that dominate the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
The amnesty law, which Sunni parties had claimed would free
the majority of detainees, only applies to those in Iraqi government
facilitiesnot the more than 20,000 people being held in
US-operated prison camps. It also does not cover thousands of
men accused of terrorism and other charges levelled
against Iraqis captured while engaged in armed resistance to the
US occupation.
Now, aggravating the sense of betrayal, the provincial election
law makes clear that the US authorities and the Shiite-dominated
government are offering Sunni factions the role of a side-lined
minority at best.
The last provincial elections in 2005 were boycotted by the
majority of Sunnis out of sympathy for the insurgency. The low
turnout in majority Sunni provinces led to the formation of unrepresentative
governments by Shiite parties or Sunni groups that were collaborating
with the occupation.
The former insurgent groups that have agreed during the past
year to end resistance and join US-backed Awakening Councils demanded
that they be represented in the provincial governments before
new ballots were held. One reason is their concern that the parties
installed in 2005 will use their grip over electoral authorities
to rig the vote in October. The provincial law did not meet this
concern. It instead proposed that the United Nationswhich
has little presence in the country, and especially not in the
volatile Sunni areasassist in organising and monitoring
the ballot.
The limited character of the concessions to Sunni demands coincides
with growing frustration inside the ranks of the Awakening Councils.
The primary motive for ending much of the insurgency last year
was fear in the Sunni elite and population as a whole over the
entrenchment of Shiite fundamentalist power. The bloody Sunni-Shiite
civil war that developed throughout 2006 led to mass killings
in Sunni areas and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Sunnis
from Baghdad and other mixed areas.
In desperation, tribal councils and Baathist-linked insurgent
groups in western Iraq and the surrounds of Baghdad accepted US
overtures for a deal. In exchange for a ceasefire and substantial
bribes, they formed US-financed militiaswhich now number
close to 80,000to work with American units in hunting down
and destroying Islamist groups that continued resistance. American
troops prevent Shiite troops, police and militia from entering
the areas under the control of the Awakening Councils. In Iraqs
capital, the US military has flung up 12-foot concrete walls around
Sunni suburbs to protect them from Shiite militias, establishing
little more than ghettos.
The curbing of Sunni attacks on US forces has been a key factor
in the substantial drop in American casualties. The collaboration,
however, has not led to the hoped-for significant political openings
for the Sunni elite or their followers. The Shiite parties view
the Awakening Councils as a long-term threat to their power. Maliki
has refused demands that the Sunni militias be recruited into
the military or police.
The tensions are now surfacing. In Diyala province, the Awakening
Council has suspended all cooperation with the occupation and
the government over allegations that the local Shiite police are
continuing to launch pogroms against Sunnis. Over recent weeks
there have been several more incidents in which US troops have
allegedly mistaken the militiamen for insurgents and attacked
them. A Sunni militia in Babil, close to Baghdad, temporarily
suspended all collaboration this week over the US killing of three
of its members and two women in separate incidents last Thursday
and Friday.
In the western Anbar province, the Awakening Council has issued
an ultimatum to the provincial government to resign by April or
it will use its 20,000-strong Sunni militia to overthrow it. The
government is headed by the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, one of
the few Sunni organisations to stand candidates in the 2005 ballot.
Only 2 percent of the population of Anbar voted.
Another key aspect of the provincial law only intensifies the
prospect of violence over the coming months. The legislation leaves
the way open for provinces in other parts of Iraq to form regions
with comparable powers to the Kurdish Regional Government in the
north (KRG). There is still no oil law to block regions from using
clauses of the 2005 US-drafted constitution to claim jurisdiction
over the development of new oil and gas fields. In the north,
the KRG has proceeded in defiance of opposition in Baghdad to
sign contracts with transnational companies for the exploration
and opening up of 15 fields.
The main party of the Shiite business and clerical establishment,
the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), is a strong advocate
of regionalism. It will be seeking to gain control of the majority
Shiite-populated southern provinces in the October election and
pursue its perspective of establishing an oil-rich autonomous
region centred on the Shiite religious capital, Najaf. The focus
of its efforts will be Basrathe centre of the oil industrywhich
is currently governed by a Shiite faction which opposes ISCIs
plans.
An ISCI-controlled Shiite regional government is expected to
seek to appropriate the bulk of the oil revenues generated by
new developments in the south, where more than 60 percent of Iraqs
reserves are located. Shiite regionalism therefore threatens to
deprive the elite in both the central Sunni provinces and Baghdad,
with its mixed Sunni-Shiite population, of any minor benefits
from the planned opening up of Iraqs vast untapped oil and
gas resources to US and other transnational energy corporations.
The centralist tendencies that advocate the concentration of
powers in the hands of the Baghdad government include Sunni parties,
the alliance headed by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, as well
as the Baghdad-based Shiite Sadrist movement and the Basra-based
Shiite Islamic Virtue Party. Apart from their rejection of regionalism,
these factions agree on little else. They represent rival and,
at times, openly hostile tendencies.
They came together, however, to attempt to block the provincial
law. The vote for the bill was deadlocked 82-82 and only passed
by the speakers casting vote. They also combined in an outpouring
of resentment against the Kurdish region during the parliamentary
sittings. The centralists stridently called for the share of the
federal budget paid to the KRG to be reduced from 17 percent to
between 14 and 15 percent. While a compromise was reached that
agreed to the 17 percent, it stipulated that a census must be
held before the next budget to determine what percentage of the
population actually lives in the KRG. A majority rejected a Kurdish
demand that the Baghdad government pay the wages of the 80,000-strong
Kurdish peshmerga militiamen in northern Iraq.
The conflict over regionalism creates two additional flashpoints.
Firstly, within the ranks of the Shiite Sadrist movement, there
are increasing demands for its leader Moqtada al Sadr to end his
opposition to armed resistance to the pro-US government. While
the Sadrist Mahdi Army militia generally complied with the ceasefire
that Sadr announced last August, the US military and ISCI-controlled
forces stepped up operations to substantially weaken the Sadrist
position in the south ahead of the provincial elections. Hundreds
and possibly thousands of Mahdi militiamen have been killed or
detained during the surge. More and more dissident groupings are
breaking with Sadr in order to fight back.
Over the past several days, US forces in Baghdad have come
under stepped-up attack from alleged rogue Shiite
militiamen. On Monday and Tuesday, Katuysha rockets were fired
at American bases in and near the capital, killing at least one
civilian contractor and wounding two soldiers.
The second volatile area is the northern oil-rich city of Kirkuk.
The opposition in Baghdad toward the Kurdish nationalists
claims on resources has further poisoned the debate over the holding
of a referendum in Kirkuk to determine whether the majority Kurdish
population wishes to join the KRG.
The Bush administration pressured the Kurdish leadership last
December to accept a delay in the scheduled holding of a vote
in order to cement Washingtons own geo-political relations
with Turkey, which opposes any strengthening of Kurdish regionalism.
The KRG now faces the likelihood that the Iraqi parliamentary
majority will push for the delay to become indefinite. Open warfare
over the issue is becoming more likely. Moreover, there are signals
that the Turkish government intends to intervene to ensure no
vote takes place. The Turkish media reported this week that the
plans are being finalised for the deployment of tens of thousands
of Turkish troops into northern Iraq during March. While the ostensible
reason is to hunt down Kurdish separatists of the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK), the operation will be designed to threaten the KRG
into dropping its designs on Kirkuk.
A year after the surge began, disgruntled Sunni, Shiite and,
increasingly, Kurdish factions are seething with resentment toward
the cynical manipulation and false promises made by the Bush White
House and US commander General David Petraeus. The political alienation
is intensified by the social catastrophe that continues to afflict
the vast majority of the population. For all the talk of reconstruction,
millions of people lack jobs, clean water, adequate food, fuel,
electricity and sewerage. The ebb in the anti-occupation insurgency
over the past six months may prove to be short-lived.
See Also:
US Defense Secretary sides with military
opposition to troop drawdown in Iraq
[14 February 2008]
Iraqi parliament in turmoil as sectarian
rivalries flare
[11 February 2008]
Turkish military again strikes Kurdish
areas in northern Iraq
[7 February 2008]
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