|
WSWS : News
& Analysis : North
America
Pentagon rules for military tribunals violate constitutional
rights
By Don Knowland
2 April 2002
Use
this version to print
| Send this
link by email | Email the
author
After a four-month delay, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
issued an order March 21 specifying the procedures for the military
tribunals that will try alleged terrorists captured in Afghanistan.
The rules are clearly designed to guarantee convictions that are
unreviewable by any judicial authority in or outside the United
States.
US media coverage and statements by US officialsincluding
congressmen who criticized the initial Bush proposal for tribunals
issued last yearsuggest that the Pentagon rules represent
a significant improvement over the initial plan. But the procedure
remains fundamentally unfair, and Pentagon spokesmen indicated
that prisoners could be detained indefinitely, even if they are
acquitted, at the discretion of the president.
Pentagon general counsel William J. Haynes II said, If
we had a trial right this minute, it is conceivable that somebody
could be tried and acquitted of that charge but may not necessarily
automatically be released. When somebodys trying to kill
you or your people, and you capture them, you can hold them. We
are within our rights, and I dont think anyone disputes
it, that we may hold enemy combatants for the duration of the
conflict. And the conflict is still going and we dont see
an end in sight right now. Since the war on terrorism
was declared by the US government, and only the US will determine
when it is over, the detention of prisoners will also be at the
will of the government.
There has been an outcry from sections of the legal profession
over this prospect. Don Rehkopf, co-chairman of the military law
committee of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL), told the press: They create a tribunal that they
say is fair, but then they can say, We dont like the
results and the hell with it, were going to hold you anyway.
This is a follow-on to their policy of holding people indefinitely
before you charge them. Rehkopf added, If I came out
of the woods after 20 years and saw these rules, Id think
Adolf Hitler or Joseph Stalin wrote them.
Haynes claimed that the Bush administration was announcing
the rules for the tribunals without allowing any time for public
comment from groups like the NACDL and the American Bar Association,
because of the need to move decisively and expeditiously
in the ongoing war against terrorism. At the same time,
US military officials suggested that no trials would be held until
the summer, or possibly not even until 2003, because of the need
to accumulate and sort through evidence and conduct interrogations
of prisoners.
Cosmetic changes in the original plan
The new rules reverse or diminish some of the more flagrant
violations of due process called for in the initial Bush plan.
A defendant will be advised of charges sufficiently in advance
of trial to prepare a defense; he must, for the most part, receive
evidence to be used against him, as well as exculpatory evidence;
and can use legal process to obtain evidence and witnesses. The
presumption of innocence will apply, as well as the usual criminal
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused cannot
be forced to testify. Unanimous rather than majority vote of seven
military commissioners (judges) will be required to impose the
death penalty.
Bush issued his executive order to provide for military tribunals
last November 13, authorizing the military detention of any non-US
citizen he determines to be a past or present member of Al Qaeda,
or otherwise involved with or harboring international terrorist
activity. The order further directed trial of such persons by
military tribunal for any violation of the law of war, and other
unspecified applicable laws.
Bushs initial order precluded review by any independent
court or tribunal. It specified that it was not practicable
to apply the usual rules of criminal law and evidence in the tribunal,
so evidence would be admissible if it has probative value
to a reasonable person, an exceptionally loose standard
for a threat to personal liberty, let alone ones life. Convictions
and sentencing required only a two-thirds vote of military judges
rather than unanimity.
The tribunals were widely derided internationally as kangaroo
courts ignoring US constitutional and international norms designed
to ensure fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings. The procedures
were revised over the next four months in order to deflect this
criticism, while preserving the essential purpose: giving the
US chief executive unprecedented and arbitrary power to arrest,
try, imprison and sentence prisoners captured in the course of
the war on terrorism.
Lack of meaningful restrictions on evidence
Rumsfelds rules permit defense cross-examination of witnesses,
the principal historical means of determining the truth in Anglo-American
trial jurisprudence. But witnesses need not testify under oath.
Most troubling, the commissioners can consider sworn or unsworn
written witness statements. In other words, a witness need not
even testify in person, depriving the defense of any cross-examination
opportunity.
Written statements are easily manufactured and falsified, presenting
a huge risk of prosecutorial abuse. This provision alone casts
doubt on whether the US military intends to acknowledge any meaningful
check on its intention to convict those the president alleges
have a connection to terrorists. No requirement of authentication
of documents or physical evidence appears in the rules.
In substance, there is an absence of any real limit on what
evidence may be admitted. The tribunal still may admit single,
double or even triple hearsay, opinion and other dubious evidence.
Again, none of this can be effectively tested by cross-examination.
Lack of access to effective counsel
Rumsfelds rules require the assignment of a military
officer to a defendant as counsel. The ranks of such military
defense counsel are normally dominated by higher-ranking officers,
and even when willing to serve their clients interests,
are often inexperienced. Imposing uniformed counsel on alleged
enemy combatants will almost inevitably chill attorney-client
communication, a prerequisite to an effective defense.
A defendant can hire additional civilian counsel at his own
expense. But that is an unlikely prospect for those detained at
Camp X-Ray, who have little in the way of financial resources.
Any funds for private attorneys can easily be challenged and seized
by the government, labeled as terrorist in origin. Finally, a
civilian attorney qualifies as counsel only if eligible to US
information of a level SECRET or higher. This presents a huge
potential for disqualifying most experienced defense counsel.
The right to effective counsel of the defendants choice
in criminal cases is enshrined in the US Constitution and is internationally
recognized as a fundamental prerequisite of a fair trial. The
tribunal rules are designed to permit the opposite result.
Secrecy of proceedings
Proceedings are to be open to the maximum extent practicable.
Yet according to the rules such open proceedings may include
the press and public and public release of transcripts at
the appropriate timeall at the discretion
of the president. In other words, open does not necessarily mean
public. This threatens to make a mockery of the US constitutional
requirement of a public trial, which is also recognized by international
law as necessary to a fair trial.
Proceedings will not be open if they involve arguably classified
or secret information, witness safety, intelligence or law enforcement
sources or methods. The result is that evidence of the most dubious
reliability generally will invoke the greatest secrecy. The accused
and civilian counsel can be excluded from ex parte or in
chambers review of such material, but not military defense counsel.
Especially given the Bush administrations amply displayed
penchant for secrecy, if not scorn for the publics right
to know, the rules vaguely announced preference for open
trial is hollow. It is also a marked contrast to the openness
of the Nazi and Japanese war crimes trials following World War
II, which the Bush administration likes to reference as historical
support for its tribunals.
Lack of review by an independent court
Bushs original military order vests exclusive jurisdiction
in the military tribunals over any individual subject to the order
for offenses. Such persons are not privileged to seek any
remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or
to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individuals
behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof,
(ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international
tribunal.
Rumsfelds rules dutifully only provide for review of
conviction and sentencing by a Review Panel comprised
of three military officers. Civilians may be commissioned to serve
on the panel. There is no provision for briefing or oral argument
before the panel. The president, or the secretary of defense,
if designated, will serve as the final reviewing authority.
This review mechanism thus adds nothing to the fairness of
the process, especially in this politically charged context. Instead
it insures that the appeal decision will be made by higher-ranking
military officers who are still subject to military and presidential
control.
In contrast, under the US Uniform Code of Military Justice,
which applies to courts martial of US military personnel, verdicts
are not final until they have been reviewed by a civilian Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
The US Constitution and international law recognize independent
impartial judges who are not beholden to any side as the bedrock
of any credible system of justice. They must be the ones to make
the basic decisions, or at least review them. Without independent
review to monitor them, the supposed protections provided in Rumsfelds
rulesthe presumption of innocence, guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, even outside counselmean little or nothing.
Imperial justice
The wrongs of King George described in the US Declaration of
Independence included that [h]e has affected to render the
Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.
For that reason, the Constitution gave Congress power over the
military, and to define and punish ... Offences against
the Law of Nations.
Creation of these tribunals violates the constitutional separation
of powers, usurping congressional power to create military tribunals,
and the authority of the judicial to try offenses and review convictions.
They are of dubious constitutionality, even under the US Supreme
Court cases that permitted war crime tribunals against Nazi spy
saboteurs and German and Japanese war criminals.
President Bush has in effect created his own separate court
and prison system. The initial decision to designate someone as
a terrorist and apprehend them is his. It is Bushs decision
whether or not to prosecute. Everyone in the tribunal process,
including the prosecutor, is subordinate to the president as the
commander in chief. Police, prosecutor, required defense counsel,
judge and the jury are all rolled into one entity, subject to
one man. That same man decides what procedural and evidentiary
safeguards are afforded the accused. This is not a system designed
to ferret out the truth or produce justice, nor hardly what the
framers of the US Constitution had in mind.
As conservative George Washington University constitutional
law professor Jonathon Turley has correctly concluded, These
rules leave the president in a role more reminiscent of a Caesar
than a civil servant.
See Also:
US prosecution brief defends brutal treatment
of American Taliban POW
[1 April 2002]
Bush expands voluntary
interviews of Middle Eastern immigrants
[29 March 2002]
Defense reveals government
conspiracy to deny John Walker Lindh access to counsel
[27 March 2002]
Military tribunals,
monitoring of lawyers: Bush announces new police-state measures
[17 November 2001]
Top of page
The WSWS invites your comments.
Copyright 1998-2008
World Socialist Web Site
All rights reserved |