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East : Libya
Lockerbie-Pan Am 103: Prosecution case evaporates
By Steve James
17 October 2000
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After six months, the prosecution case in the trial of the
two Libyans accused of blowing up Pan Am 103 on December 21 1988
has all but evaporated. The defendants, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed
Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, are being tried at a special
court in Camp Zeist, a former US military base in the Netherlands,
which was designated as Scottish territory for the purpose of
the proceedings.
At the time of writing, the trial has again been interrupted
after Scottish Lord Advocate Colin Boyd informed the three trial
judges that new and unspecified information relating to the defence
case had been made available to the prosecution by "a government,
but not that of the USA. The adjournment came on the day before
Mohamed Abu Talb, a former member of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC) was due to give
evidence for the prosecution. Talb, who is already serving a life
sentence in Sweden for planting bombs, is one of those cited by
the defence in their special defence of incrimination. This states
that the PFLP-GC was, with others, responsible for the atrocity
that killed 270 people. Talb denies any involvement and is now
scheduled to give evidence on October 17. He has apparently been
offered remission of his present sentence and immunity from further
prosecution if he testifies.
A report in the October 15 Scotland on Sunday newspaper
suggested that the government in question referred to by Boyd
was Syria, and that a "confession" by Talb had been
handed over to the prosecution. The Lord Advocate has also arranged
an explanatory meeting with angry relatives of those who died
in the explosion, who fear the trial may now disintegrate.
The present adjournment is the latest in a series that have
preceded the appearance of particularly controversial witnesses
or pieces of evidence.
Shortly before the trial commenced, the Swiss manufacturer
of the timing device implicated in the explosion announced that
from their own research, they concluded the bomb had not been
located in the luggage container in a Samsonite suitcase, as the
prosecution team claimed, but was jammed against the aircraft
wall. Such public announcements from a leading witness threw the
prosecution into crisis, triggered a round of legal threats to
newspapers such as the Glasgow-based Sunday Herald who
had printed the claims made by Edwin Bollier, CEO of MEBO, which
made the MST-13 electronic timers alleged to have triggered the
explosion.
When he eventually took the stand in June, both prosecution
and defence questioning of Bollier revealed the extent of MEBO's
relations both with the Libyan government and the former East
German security police, the Stasi. He sold prototype timers, and
millions of pounds worth of electronic equipment, including exploding
mobile pagers and encryption manuals to the Stasi, who are known
to have supplied the PFLP-GC with equipment. Bollier supplied
Libya with radio antennae, bomb timers, and had observed explosives'
trials in the Libyan desert. He rented a Swiss office to one of
the accused, who it is likely had some role in the Libyan intelligence
service. Bollier also had unspecified relations with other Middle
Eastern governments and with the CIA.
Bollier's was followed by a series of witnessesCIA and
ex-Stasi spies, other MEBO staff, airport staff, a clothes shop
ownerwhose testimony reveals a prosecution case that is
characterised by its extreme flimsiness, resting almost exclusively
on tenuous circumstantial evidence, for which alternative explanations
can easily be found.
The prosecutions most heralded witness was Abdul Majid Giacka,
who has been living in the US under a witness protection programme
since 1991. Long presented to the family members of the US victims
as a crucial eyewitness, Giacka's evidence proved disastrous for
the prosecution case.
Giacka, it finally emerged, offered to provide the CIA with
information after he joined Libyan intelligence to avoid military
service in 1988. Such was the low level of the information that
he presented to the CIA that by 1991 his handlers considered halting
all payments to their dubious asset, who was costing them $1,000
a month. Despite a period working alongside both the accused at
Malta airport, Giacka never mentioned Lockerbie or suitcase bombs
to his CIA handlers at the time.
In July 1991 Giacka attended a meeting with the CIA, at which
his continued employment on Langley's payroll was to be discussed.
The next day, more than two years after the Pan Am bombing, Giacka
presented the CIA with an account according to which Fhimah and
Megrahi had carried a "Samsonite" suitcase through Maltese
customs.
The defence also cited censored CIA cables to illuminate some
of Giacka's other extravagant accusations. He claimed at one point
that Libyan leader Moammar Qhaddaffi was a freemason, and that
he (Giacka) was related to the former Libyan monarch, King Idris.
It also became clear from the cables that at the time of the bombing
the CIA did not consider Fhimah to be a member of the Libyan intelligence
services.
According to Clare Connolly from the Glasgow University's Lockerbie
Trial Briefing Unit, "The defence cross-examination made
it clear that Giaka's actions in providing this information to
investigators could have been motivated by a desire for money
and a wish to secure his future as a US citizen."
On other occasions, Giaka's reliance on US officials sitting
on the prosecution bench was so blatant that UN observers attending
the trial told the Sunday Times, "We could not see
how Mr Giaka conducted himself, but the defence raised objections
repeatedly to the looks that passed between him and the Americans...
With other witnesses introduced at the American end of the investigation,
through the CIA or the FBI, we have witnessed those types of exchanges."
The prosecution are so short of serious evidence that, despite
the numerous delays, the trial is expected to last much less than
the full year initially anticipated.
The PFLP-GC were the original suspects, and for two years after
the crash most of the investigating authorities operated on the
basis that the evidence against the PFLP-GC was overwhelming.
The US intelligence services have played a dubious role from before
the crash right through to the trial. It is a fact that several
US Special Forces members died on Pan Am 103, and that their luggage
recovered from the crash site was interfered with.
No trial in legal history has been so bound up with shifts
in world politics, a study of which is very revealing. Initial
accusations directed against the PFLP-GC regarded the Lockerbie
bombing as a reprisal, organised by Iran, Syria and the PFLP-GC,
for the shooting down of an Iranian Airbus on July 3, 1988 by
the US. The December 21 1988 bombing came little more than a month
after the Palestinian National Council meeting which effectively
sanctioned the existence of Israel. On December 13 PLO leader
Yassir Arafat expounded on this in his historic speech to the
United Nations. The pro-Syrian PFLP-GC opposed the PLO's line,
and, along with other Palestinian groups advocating the continuation
of a military strategy against Israel, launched a series of raids
designed to derail the PLO's developing relations with the US.
The PFLP-GC had on numerous occasions been involved in fire-fights
in Beirut with the PLO and had been implicated in a series of
attacks on aircraft.
The change in focus to Libya was, at the time, widely interpreted
as a political response by the US in line with its preparation
for the Gulf War, with both Syria and Iran acting as crucial US
allies in the attack on Iraq. Subsequently, the US used Lockerbie
and other attributed bombings as a justification for imposing
sanctions against Libya. The present case only emerged in the
context of the Libyan regime's developing international relations,
particularly with Europe, and after months of negotiations by
Nelson Mandela and Kofi Annan.
If the Scotland on Sunday reports are confirmed, it
would not be the first time that the Syrian government has dumped
its erstwhile allies, in pursuing closer relations with the US.
Following Syria's support for the Gulf War, Syria's then leader,
Hafez al-Assad, handed over information on planned terrorist attacks,
evicted Carlos "the Jackal" from Damascus, and latterly
expelled Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan, allowing
his capture by the CIA and subsequent trial in Turkey.
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