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WSWS : News
& Analysis : Asia
: Japan
Worker's death exposes the dirty secrets of Japan's nuclear
industry
By James Conachy
6 January 2000
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Hisashi Ouchi, one of three workers exposed to massive doses
of radiation during last September's accident at the Tokai-mura
nuclear fuel processing plant, died of heart failure on December
21 at the University of Tokyo Hospital. He had been exposed to
17,000 times the legally sanctioned dose of radiationcomparable
with radiation levels at the epicentre of the atomic bomb dropped
on Hiroshima. His immune system had been destroyed, with his white
blood cell count barely registering.
For 83 days medical staff exerted unprecedented efforts to
keep Hisashi alive, including daily blood transfusions, multiple
skin transplants and what is believed to be the world's first
transfusion of peripheral stem cells. Doctors treating him stated
that he displayed signs of pain throughout his treatment, despite
huge doses of painkillers. He was resuscitated from a heart failure
on November 27. He lost consciousness in mid-October and never
regained it.
A preliminary investigation published by Japan's Science and
Technology Agency (STA) on November 5 makes clear the Tokai-mura
accident and Hisashi's death are the direct product of cost-cutting
and appalling safety standards inside the plant.
The JCO Corporation, which operated the Tokai-mura plant, chemically
purified enriched uranium dioxide, which was supplied to many
of Japan's 51 nuclear reactors. Along with two other workers,
Hisashi was delegated on the day of the accident to finish an
order for a specialised type of uranium fuel for an experimental
reactor known as Joyo. Production of fuel for Joyo involved handling
enriched uranium with 18.8 percent of the fissile U-235 isotope
as compared to just 5 percent for commercial reactor fuel.
The process involved mixing a uranium oxide with nitric acid
in a dissolving tank to produce uranyl nitrate. The mixture is
transferred by pump into a specially designed buffer tank and
from there it is passed into a precipitation tank. It is then
mixed with ammonia to precipitate solid uranium oxide that is
of a purer grade. This is repeated until the required level of
chemical purity is reached. JCO had altered the safety manual
to permit workers to combine uranium oxide and nitric acid in
steel buckets rather than the dissolving tank. The solution was
manually poured into the buffer tank.
Due to the risk of forming a critical mass of uranium fuel
that would initiate a nuclear chain reaction, the Japanese government
standards stipulated that no more than 2.4 kilograms of enriched
uranium oxide could be mixed at a time. The buffer tank is shaped
to prevent a critical mass occurring, even if the limit is exceeded.
The STA investigation stated that it was common practice at JCO
for up to 16 kilograms to be poured into the buffer tank.
On September 30, JCO was rushing to produce enriched uranium
oxide to fulfill an order for Joyo fuel. Two of the three workers
assigned to the task had never carried out the process before.
None of them were aware of the dangers involved nor were they
were under the supervision of technicians or managers. Over the
previous years, JCO had cut its staffing levels from 162 to 110
due to falling profits and sales. University qualified technical
staff had been reduced from 34 to 20.
To save time the untrained and unsupervised workers mixed seven
buckets, or some 16 kilograms, and poured them directly into the
precipitation tank instead of the specially shaped buffer tank.
As the seventh bucket was poured in the mixture reached critical
mass initiating a sustained chain reaction.
The nuclear reaction lasted up to 20 hours exposing the plant
and 500 metres beyond to levels of radiation many times above
the official safe dose. Even though hundreds of people live and
work in the immediate vicinity, the company did not inform the
STA for at least 45 minutes and government authorities gave no
evacuation order for four-and-a-half hours.
At least 69 people, mainly JCO workers, but also firefighters
and local residents, were exposed to unsafe levels of radiation.
The long-term impact on the estimated 300,000 workers and residents
within a 10-kilometre radius of the plant will not be known for
years.
The Tokai-mura plant was incapable of containing a radiation
leak and had no emergency plan in place in case of a nuclear accident.
The company had received approval from the government for construction
on the basis that an accident was impossible because the density
and mass of mixtures could never approach critical mass. No government
regulator had inspected the operation in 10 years.
The accident at Tokai-mura was not an isolated event. There
have now been five nuclear-related accidents since 1995. In the
aftermath of Tokai-mura, there was a public outcry with opinion
polls showing 70 percent of the population opposed to nuclear
energy on safety grounds and criticisms of the lack of government
control of the privately owned and essentially self-regulated
nuclear industry.
As a result the Labor Ministry conducted inspections of 17
facilities. Health and safety violations were found at 15. Inspections
of nine nuclear fuel processing plants and laboratories found
25 violations ranging from inadequate training of staff, failure
to provide workers with regular medical checkups and failure to
report radiation exposures. These were not, however, snap inspections.
Lacking its own protective equipment, the Labor Ministry had given
the companies 24 hours advance notice.
The safety record of Japan's nuclear industry as a whole is
now coming under intense public scrutiny. Particular attention
is being given to the research of Yuko Fujita, an associate professor
of Physics at Keio University, who has been campaigning for years
for better safety conditions in nuclear industry. He told that
the Japan Times on December 27: "The nuclear industry
is sustained by workers exposed to deadly radiation".
Fujita cites a case two years ago when around 1,000 unskilled
workers were hired by the Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Power Plant to
replace a core shroud in one of the plant's reactors. The atmosphere
inside the reactor was so radioactive that workers could only
remain inside for three minutes. Under Japanese health standards,
it is entirely legal for a worker to be exposed to the maximum
official annual dose of radiation in a matter of minutes. The
limit in Japan is 50 millisieverts per year as compared to international
recommendations of 100 millisieverts over five years.
Fujita has focused on the abuse of sub-contract workers. While
the nuclear plants maintain a core staff of technicians and skilled
workers, the bulk of labour is supplied by subcontracting firms.
Of the 71,000 workers currently working in the nuclear industry,
at least 63,000 or 89 percent, are employed by contractors. The
companies who own the plants are therefore not responsible for
monitoring their health or providing stable employment. Yuko Fujita
believes that of the 300,000 workers employed in the nuclear industry
since the 1970s, at least 800 have been exposed to potentially
cancer-causing levels of radiation.
Many of the workers employed for the most dangerous labour
are believed to be hired on a day-to-day basis from the swelling
numbers of homeless and destitute workers in areas like Tokyo's
Sanya district and the Kotobuki area of Yokohama. With work in
the nuclear power plants paying up to three times more than the
construction sites and factories, there is no lack of volunteers.
When they have been exposed to the annual radiation limits, the
workers are fired and sent back to the streets. It is feared that
some workers are then re-hired for work in other plants under
false names, where they are exposed to further radiation. Japanese
trade unions only cover one third of nuclear industry workers
and maintain a close collaboration with the major employers. They
have done little to halt the abuse of contract workers and deny
it is taking place.
Among the poorest of the poor, these workers rarely know their
legal rights and generally do not pursue court actions against
the nuclear companies or the subcontractors. A report by the Los
Angeles Times on December 31 cited the case of Kunio Murai.
In 1970 he was hired as a day labourer for janitorial work in
a nuclear power plant. Along with another worker, he was instructed
to mop up a leak of radioactive water. They were provided with
no safety equipment and worked two hours in a confined space.
Their radiation meter registered off the scale, but the untrained
workers believed it must have been broken. Six months later Kunio's
teeth and hair fell out and his joints ached. A diagnosing doctor,
provided by the nuclear company, assessed his medical problems
as unrelated to his work. Later, on the understanding that no
legal action would be taken, he was paid off with $60,000.
A Japanese Labor Ministry spokesman, quoted in the Los Angles
Times, summed up the official position toward the continuing
health concerns: "There is work that exposes people to radiation
that has to be done so long as you want to sustain the current
energy supply. They say it is discrimination, but there is freedom
of work in our country, and if people don't want these jobs they
can quit".
Speaking to the Japan Times, Fujita commented: "I
often go to the Yokohama's Kotobuki area and tell workers not
to work at nuclear power plants, but they ask me, 'How else can
I keep from starving to death?' For many day labourers, earning
money for tomorrow's bread is much more important than the risk
of cancer several years down the line."
See Also:
Safety violations produce
Japan's worst nuclear accident
[4 October 1999]
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