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Argentina's presidential candidates vow to slash spending
By Will Marshall
18 October 1999
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An ongoing economic crisis overshadows the upcoming October
24 presidential elections in Argentina. The country is in its
deepest recession in 10 years, with the economy contracting by
3 percent during 1999. Complicating this, Argentina has seen its
access to credit worsen since Brazil's currency devaluation in
January destabilised and discouraged investment throughout the
region.
Both of the major candidates running for election have heeded
the demands of the financial markets for deeper cutbacks to social
spending. Eduardo Duhalde from the ruling Justicialist Party (the
Peronists) says the next administration must take rapid measures
or the currency will be in danger of a devaluation.
If Duhalde is successful, his economics minister will be Jorge
Lenicov, who says no-one wants to increase spending, because
lowering the deficit and the creation of an anti-crisis fund are
objectives we share even with the opposition.
Duhalde's opponents are equally strident in their attempts
to satisfy the money markets. The opposition Alliance Party says
it will make tough spending cuts in 2000 if elected to government.
Alliance economist Jose Luis Machinea predicts a $5 billion budget
deficit by 2000 and says: We need tough spending cuts, especially
in the provinces.
The Buenos Aires Herald commented: The truth today,
however, is that there is not a great difference between the Justicialist
and the Alliance platforms. At times there are noises heard that
might be branded left' of centre or to the right'
of some narrow perception. But the economic policies spoken of
by the planners in both parties are only fractionally different.
Nevertheless, Alliance leader Fernando de la Rua, the current
mayor of Buenos Aires, is easily leading in the polls with 45
percent support compared to 26 percent for Duhalde, the governor
of Buenos Aires Province. Polls have shown that even in traditional
Peronist strongholds such as Ciudad Evita, in the province of
Buenos Aires, many are abandoning the Peronists.
The Alliance was formed in 1997 out of a merger between the
Radical Party (UCR), the oldest party, traditionally based on
the middle class, and the Alliance for Work, Justice, and
Education (FREPASOFrente Pais Solidaridad). FREPASO
is a loose coalition of various political groupings: it consists
of former Peronists, disaffected by the current Peronist government
of President Carlos Menem, as well as former Radicals.
De la Rua is playing upon the corruption and sinking popularity
of the Menem regime, advancing proposals to weed out corruption
and cronyism from public office, including judicial appointments.
His campaign portrays the Peronists as big spenders who enjoy
the perks of office at the expense of the majority of the population.
The Alliance says it will improve the country's trade performancein
fact double Argentina's exportsand therefore reduce unemployment,
but without saying how. De la Rua claims, for example, that he
will cut spending without cutting jobs.
The Buenos Aires Herald noted how little detail De la
Rua is providing about his policies: Much of that thinking,
however, seems to be taking place in private, with De la Rua revealing
little of what a potential Alliance administration will entail.
This makes De la Rua almost a disciple of President Carlos Menem,
who in 1989 rode to victory on a populist platform and then did
exactly the opposite. De la Rua's campaign advertisements look
nice and you feel like not voting for the Peronists after watching
them, but they do not say much else.
Duhalde's flagging fortunes are no doubt linked to the widespread
disenchantment with Menem, whose personal popularity has slumped
to 20 percent, its lowest level ever. After two presidential terms,
Menem is obliged by the constitution to retire this year. Apart
from corruption, he is known for doubling unemployment to 14.5
percent, and for seeking to cling to office by changing the constitution.
He says that if a Peronist is the next president, someone
will be in office, but I will be in power.
Most of Duhalde's support is concentrated amongst the poorer
sections of society and the elderly, where the Peronists have
usually maintained 30 percent of the vote. Duhalde has, to an
extent, attempted to revive the traditional populism of Peronism,
saying at one rally: Those who want more austerity should
vote for de la Rua. Those who want productivity and jobs should
vote for me.
But there is a general feeling of scepticism towards such rhetoric.
After all, Menem came to power in 1989 by promising a return to
the state regulation of the economy, and a moratorium on the national
debt, only to implement one of the most rapid privatisation programs
in the world.
The dominance of world finance over Argentina was graphically
shown only three months ago. In an attempt to salvage his situation,
and gain voter sympathy, Duhalde proclaimed that creditors should
overlook some of the Argentine foreign debt of more than $100
billion. The reaction was quick and painful. Argentina's stock
market fell by 9 percent, forcing Duhalde to retract his statement.
Yet it was only in 1997 that international institutions hailed
the restructuring of the Argentinian economy over the past decade.
The Menem government had pegged the peso to the US dollar in 1991
and opened many areas of the economy up to transnational companies.
In just four years, it had privatised banks, the national airline,
railways, fuel, natural gas, electricity, telecommunications,
ports, water and sewerage services, and manufacturing, including
steel, various assembly operations, defense-related industries
and the state oil company.
According to a World Bank report: The privatisation program
was unique in the world since it covered all major enterprises
and it was accomplished in record time. IMF managing director
Michel Camdessus said Argentina's reforms would allow nations
to achieve high-quality growth of the kind that will be
genuinely sustainable over the long term. An article in
the New York Times in 1997 predicted that the arrangement
between the IMF and Argentina, would serve as a model for
developing countries elsewhere in Latin America.
But then came the Asian meltdown. A study conducted by the
Institute of Industrial Development concluded that the Asian crisis
had undermined the economic measures of the 1990s, by making Asian
goods cheaper than Argentine exports. It said 40 percent of the
cuts to export costs had been lost, while for industrial exports,
the figure was 70 percent. The car, textile and footwear industries
were particularly affected, as well as some agricultural products.
Prior to the Asian crisis, Argentina imported 340,000 pairs of
shoes from Asia a month. The figure is now two million.
Even worse is the deepening trade rift between Argentina and
Brazil, both facing recessions. The Mercosur trade agreement that
links Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay with associates
Chile and Bolivia, is under pressure. In the aftermath of the
Asian crisis, Brazil was forced to devalue its currency in January
this year. Its exports arrive at much lower prices, undercutting
Argentine firms. There have been ongoing disputes over different
industries, including the shoe trade. Brazil has suspended preferential
treatment of 400 Argentine products.
Whoever is elected in November, the money markets are demanding
greater attacks on social conditions. An already deplorable situation
for the vast majority of people is going to get worse. A World
Bank report from 1998 showed that Argentina had 13.4 million people
in poverty, or 36 percent of the population, while 3.2 million
people lived on just $70 per month.
The IMF has announced it will offer a $10 billion package to
help Argentina restore investor confidence. But, in return, it
is demanding another round of austerity measures. IMF chief economist
Michael Mussa proposed that Argentina make labour market and structural
reforms. Referring to the cuts to social spending, Freddy Thomsen
of ING Baring said: The IMF doesn't care how they get there.
They just have to get to the bottom line.
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