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The struggle for Caspian oil, the crisis in Russia and the
breakup of the Commonwealth of Independent States
By Patrick Richter
1 July 1999
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As NATO troops occupy Kosovo and the media is busy justifying
the bombing of Yugoslavia, new struggles are developing away from
the front lines which could lead to much greater military conflagrations.
Such conflicts are taking place on the territory of the former
Soviet Union, the source of the world's largest untapped reserves
of oil and gas and a region where Russian influence has declined
dramatically.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 8,
1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was founded,
consisting of Russia, White Russia and the Ukraine. On December
21 of the same year a further eight former Soviet republics joined
the CISthe states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan. The Commonwealth
was founded in Alma Ata, the former capital of Kazakhstan. In
1993 the Caucasus republic of Georgia also joined the union.
Russian power was the cement which held the CIS together. However
the economic, political and military weakening of Russia has brought
into the open the centrifugal forces which had led to the dissolution
of the Soviet Union in the first place and have marked the CIS
from its very beginning. Two events have accelerated this process:
the financial crisis in Russia of August 1998 and the political
humiliation of Russia by NATO in the war against Yugoslavia.
At the beginning of the 1990s Russia was able, with its powerful
military apparatus, to exert its influence over various political
conflicts taking place within the former Soviet republics. By
stationing troops Russia was able to ensure a temporary status
quo between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh;
in Georgia it supported the Abkhazia separatist movement; in Tajikistan
it maintained the weak pro-Moscow puppet government of Imomali
Rachmonov against the Islamic opposition (UTO); in Moldova it
backed the Russian separatist Transnistria republic.
More recently Moscow's military grip over these republics has
weakened, while new conflicts have arisen and old ones have reemerged.
This development is bound up with Russia's own decline and the
fact that the Central Asian and Caucasus regions have developed
relations in other directions.
Overall internal trade between the CIS states has fallen by
two-thirds since 1991. The percentage of foreign trade has declined
from 78 percent in 1991 to 24 percent today. Trade of White Russia,
the Ukraine, Moldova and Kazakhstan with Russia is down between
40 and 60 percent; between Russia and the Caucasus republics of
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan trade has fallen by an average
of 23 percent; between Russia and the rest of the Central Asian
republics (Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) the
decline on average is 13 percent. While the Ukraine, Moldova and
Georgia are striving to develop close links with the European
Union, the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan aim to develop
relations with Turkey, Iran and China.
This process has intensified considerably since last year's
financial crisis in Russia. Up to that point Russia, as the most
stable of the CIS economies, was able to artificially maintain
links to the republics by buying products which were uncompetitive
on the world market and making available non-repayable credits.
Since the August crisis, however, Russia has been transformed
from a centre of gravitation to a source of economic tremors.
The main concern of all its former partners has been to put sufficient
distance between themselves and Russia, according to Yuri
Shishkov, deputy chairman of the Institute for World Economy and
International Relations of the Russian Academy of Science. All
of the integration programmes within the framework of CIS are
a thing of the past, he wrote in the weekly Obshaya Gazeta
of May 13-19, 1999.
The atmosphere between Russia and the partner countries
has cooled considerably. Whereas a chorus of hope and optimism
greeted the founding of the CIS, today it is regarded as a listless
organisation, whose authority is not taken seriously by
any of the member countries. Kyrgyzstan, for example, recently
joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in open defiance of
the customs regulations drawn up by five of the CIS member countries.
Turkmenia, which was formerly only able to offer its gas to the
world market via Russian pipelines and with a Russian subsidy,
now delivers through Iran and is gradually breaking all its relations
with Russia. Train connections and travel without a visa between
Moscow and the Turkmenian capital, Ashkhabad, have been stopped.
The most significant organisation to emerge as a challenger
to Russian influence is the union of states known as GUAM, formed
in 1998 by Georgia, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In April
1999 the union was extended to include Uzbekistan (after which
the organization's name was changed to GUUAM). From its outset
the proclaimed aim of the alliance was the revival of the Silk
Road.
This point was first made by the Georgian president and former
foreign minister of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, Edward Shevardnadze.
At an Asian Pacific Economic Community (APEC) forum in 1994 he
called for the integration of the Central Asian and Caucasus states
into the world market with the aid of a trans-European Caucasus/Pacific
communications system.
The heart of this system is a transport route for Azeri oil
which circumvents Russia and its spheres of influence.
The trans-Caucasian states of Azerbaijan and Georgia would become
key elements in a transport system linking Asia and Europe and
controlling the passage of goods by road and rail. Such a system
would be highly attractive to investors. The first projects involved
in this system, such as the construction of a highway from the
north Turkish industrial town of Samsun to the Georgian port of
Batumi, are being built oras with the oil pipeline between
the Azerbaijani capital of Baku and the Georgian Black Sea port
of Supsaare already finished.
The European Union, which partly financed this latter project,
seeks as well to participate in an oil transport route between
Poti and Ilytshovsk. This will secure a direct route for Azerbaijani
oil to the states of western and southeastern Europe fully independent
of Russia. Instead of the existing route from Grosny to Novorossik
in Russia, it is to be transported by rail from Baku to the Georgian
port of Poti and then transported by ship to the Ukrainian port
of Odessa Ilytshovsk.
Ukraine and neighbouring Moldova are making their own oil pipeline
available to the Czech and Slovakian republics and Rumania, and
then to Western Europe and the Balkans. By so doing they can free
themselves altogether from Russian oil interests and grab their
own share of business. Talks are being held with Turkmenia over
oil and gas pipelines through the Caspian Sea over Baku, and further
on to Georgia and Turkey.
A major problem, however, is the existence of ethnic conflicts
in these countries. Up until now these antagonisms were utilised
by Russia to maintain its control and hinder the efforts of these
states to free themselves from Moscow's grip. But with Russia's
decline the GUUAM states are more and more openly opposing Moscow
and seeking the support of the United States in order to assert
their own interests.
Uzbekistan's entry into the GUUAM alliance took place in Washington
during the festivities to mark the fiftieth anniversary of NATO,
which were boycotted by Russia in protest over the bombing of
Yugoslavia. For their part the presidents of the GUUAM states
made clear their unqualified support for the actions of the US
and NATO.
Moreover, since the beginning of the year joint military maneuvers
by the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been taking place
for the first time without the participation of Russia. The maneuvers
were conducted as defence exercises for the newly opened oil routes.
Immediately after the CIS summit in Moscow last April, these countries
asserted their de facto withdrawal from the treaty of Tashkent,
agreed in 1992 between the CIS states with the aim of creating
a joint defence framework.
The United States has warmly approved the aims of GUUAM. As
early as 1997 the US Congress passed a resolution declaring the
Caspian and Caucasus region to be a zone of vital American
interests. At the end of April this year Clinton's special
envoy for energy diplomacy, R. Morningstar, outlined American
interests in a number of points: 1) independence, sovereignty
and welfare in these countries to be secured through the imposition
of economic and political reforms; 2) reducing the danger of regional
conflict through the involvement of the states in international
economic collaboration; 3) strengthening the energy security of
the USA and its allies with the help of the countries of the Caspian
region and; 4) expanding the opportunities for American corporations.
An especially aggressive role is being played by oil-rich Azerbaijan,
where American petroleum concerns are responsible for more than
50 percent of oil investment. Its president, Heydar Aliyev, has
repeatedly boasted that the great possibilities for the
deepening and broadening of economic and military collaboration
with the USA and NATO have been fully exploited. Intense
efforts have been made to establish an American, Turkish or NATO
base as a counterpart to Armenia (which is supported by Russia)
on the territory of the former Soviet air defence base Nasosnaya,
located 45 km north of Baku.
The US, which is evidently prepared to impose its interests
in the region by means of military force, sent a working group
of American officers under the leadership of General Charles Box
on a special mission to the area. According to the Russian weekly
Vyek (century), they examined the possibilities of stationing
NATO troops for the strengthening of security and stability
in the Caucasus.
It was more than empty words when Azerbaijani Defence Minister
Safar Abiyev called for a peace intervention by NATO
in connection with renewed fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. He had
already offered NATO the use of Azeri air installations for the
Alliance's operations in Yugoslavia.
Europe is also well aware of the significance of the region.
NATO General Secretary Javier Solanas, who has visited the region
twice in the past two years, stated, Europe cannot be totally
secure as long as the Caucasus states remain outside the borders
of European security.
Russian influence and CIS stability are also under threat from
the Islamic side. Because of the decline in Moscow's authority,
President Rachmonov of Tajikistan was forced to make further concessions
to the Islamistic United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which has controlled
half of the shattered country since the end of the five-year civil
war in 1997. The opposition has close relations to the Afghan
Taliban militia, and in the latest conflict opposition leader
Nuri received four additional ministerial posts in the coalition
government that was formed after the civil war.
Uzbekistan, where a third of the population belongs to the
ethnic Tajik minority, fears for its future amid growing pressure
from Tajikistan and an increase in incidents on its short border
with Afghanistan. Were Russia to desert its neighbour Tajikistan,
and the latter to fall into the hands of the Islamists, Uzbekistan
would hardly be in a position to defend its borders. This is why
Uzbekistan President Karimov is seeking to secure his rule with
the help of the US and GUUAM.
The only CIS state to maintain unconditional loyalty to Russia
is White Russia, whose economy has hit rock bottom. During the
Soviet era White Russia was closely integrated into the Russian
economy and was known as the Russian tool-shop. Today
its economy is totally uncompetitive on the world market, and
its output has declined to less than 30 percent of the level in
1989.
Those seeking to determine the source of future military conflicts
should follow the flow of oil and gold. The ethnic conflicts encountered
along the way could well serve as the trigger for new NATO interventions.
See Also:
NATO-Russian standoff in Kosovo
contains seeds of future wars
[15 June 1999]
After the Slaughter: Political
Lessons of the Balkan War
[14 June 1999]
Why is NATO at war with Yugoslavia?
World power, oil and gold
[24 May 1999]
Between the IMF and Russian
nationalism
Chernomyrdin, Gazprom and Moscow's role in the Kosovo war
[18 May 1999]
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