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Africa
Biography falls short of penetrating myth surrounding ANC
leader
MandelaThe Authorised Biography
By Ann Talbot
5 August 1999
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MandelaThe Authorised Biography, by Anthony Sampson,
Harper Collins 1999
Nelson Mandela has become an icon of the late twentieth century.
His release from prison on 11 February 1990, after more than a
quarter of a century of incarceration, seemed to many to offer
the prospect of progress after a decade dominated by the reactionary
policies of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. An estimated
200 million people watched the televised pop concert from a packed
Wembley Stadium that celebrated his seventieth birthday while
still a prisoner in 1988.
Many of them had not even been born when Mandela was sentenced
to life imprisonment in 1962. Few of those who were swept up in
the wave of enthusiasm for Mandela's release followed the developing
events in South Africa closely. Some were not even sure where
South Africa was. Writing to her father from America, where she
was studying, Mandela's daughter Zeni noted, "Some think
it is somewhere in the Caribbean." Yet Mandela's name and,
once he was released, his face were to become known around the
world. With his release Mandela, the most famous prisoner in the
world, came to be regarded as the president who single-handedly
saved South Africa from a bloodbath and managed to achieve a peaceful
transition from apartheid to democracy. This near saintly figure
is the subject of Anthony Sampson's authorised biography of Mandela
which appears this year to coincide with his retirement from the
presidency.
For all that he professes his desire to write about the man
behind the icon, Sampson never succeeds in penetrating the myth
that surrounds Mandela because it is too much a creation of the
liberal media circles from which Sampson himself comes. This is
not to say that Sampson's biography is poor one. On the contrary,
it is a rich source of information about Mandela, the ANC and
South Africa. Sampson writes in an accessible style, never allowing
the book to become bogged down in detail, which is an accomplishment
in a well researched and documented work such as this. But for
all his craftsmanship as a writer Sampson lacks the historical
perspective that would have been necessary to see beyond the halo
of limelight that still surrounds Mandela as he steps down from
the presidential stage. Such a historical perspective does not
have to wait on the passage of time, nor is it a question of character
assassination, but rather of setting the individual in a historical
context and drawing out the interconnections between the character
and actions of an historical figure and the times and circumstances
that made them and which they in turn helped to shape.
One of the best ways of detaching Mandela the historical figure
from the media creation that is the Mandela myth is to consider
the legacy that he leaves to South Africa. His personal reputation
remains high, but the bright hopes of reform that accompanied
him into office have been dimmed as his country has become mired
in poverty and crime. The rise in crime is a product of the levels
of poverty which are unprecedented in a developed industrialised
country. Those living in third world poverty have Western levels
of wealth flaunted in front of them daily. The World Bank calculates
that income inequality in South Africa is amongst the highest
in the world. Only Brazil has a worse record. Monthly household
incomes for black households average R757 compared to R4,695 for
whites. The ANC inherited this level of poverty from the apartheid
system, but it has done nothing to reduce the gulf between rich
and poor. Even the comparatively modest programme of social reforms
that the ANC set for itself has fallen by the wayside to be replaced
by a scramble for wealth on the part of leading ANC members. In
addition to the poverty inherited from apartheid an increasing
disparity has emerged among black households as a black middle
class has emerged.
The starkest figure of social inequality in South Africa is
the infant mortality rate. Between 70 and 100 black infants die
out of every thousand born, a figure comparable to that in Bangladesh,
one of the poorest countries in the world, while only 9 per 1,000
white infants die. Yet under the government's Reconstruction and
Development Programme health spending has been pegged at existing
levels. Sampson does not attempt to hide the failure of Mandela's
social policies, but absolves him from responsibility, attributing
it to the operation of the world market. He pictures Mandela's
government as being overwhelmed by economic forces which were
outside its control. It was merely Mandela's misfortune to come
to power at a time when the world economy was becoming ever more
globalised and national governments were losing their ability
to pursue economic policies in relative isolation from international
markets.
Yet as his own book shows the ANC recognised these changed
circumstances even before the election when they made their promises
of social reform. They had already agreed a secret letter of intent
which, as Sampson explains, "committed them to reducing the
deficit, to high interest rates and to an open economy, in return
for access to an IMF loan of $850 million, if required" (p.
473). Contained within this agreement was the unspoken guarantee
that Mandela's government would not carry out any major social
reforms because the international markets would regard the provision
of adequate health care for black infants as an unwarranted extravagance.
Even though accepting the implications of the globally integrated
economy meant ditching large parts of the ANC programme, such
as nationalisations, Mandela was well prepared for it, because
he had never been in favor of anything other than pro-capitalist
measures. Supporters of apartheid often accused Mandela of being
a communist. The truth is that he was always a nationalist whose
ambition was to allow black Africans the opportunity to become
capitalists. This goal was explicitly set out in the ANC's 1955
Freedom Charter, which was to remain the movement's main statement
of principles and programme.
Mandela reiterated the nationalist and capitalist character
of the Freedom Charter in an article he wrote in 1956. He explained
that the intention of the ANC was not to overthrow capitalism
but to break the hold of the big corporations that dominated the
South African economy. "The breaking up and democratisation
of these monopolies will open up fresh fields for the development
of a prosperous non-European bourgeois class. For the first time
in the history of this country the non-European bourgeoisie will
have the opportunity to own in their own name and right mills
and factories and trade and private enterprise will boom and flourish
as never before" (p. 95). Mandela continued to argue throughout
his imprisonment that the ANC's struggle was to allow the black
middle class access to capital. During the late 1970s a fierce
ideological debate went on among the prisoners on Robben Island
about the character of the Freedom Charter. Against other prisoners
who argued that the Freedom Charter was a socialist document,
Mandela held that its purpose was to establish a bourgeois democracy
and to maintain the capitalist system. That is precisely what
his government has achieved.
Although every other aspect of the ANC's programme has been
dropped, its central plankcreating black capitalistshas
been adhered to with religious fervour. The government-backed
New Africa Investment Limited (NAIL) has provided the capital
for black businessmen to buy up peripheral companies from the
giant mining corporations that still dominate the South African
economy. Under the new economic conditions that prevail in the
world market the unwieldy conglomerates have been forced to unbundle
their activities to maintain the profitability of their core business.
Meanwhile ANC officials have been co-opted onto the boards of
major companies with a handsome wad of share certificates to smooth
their passage from the liberation struggle. The form of the transition
might be somewhat different from that which the ANC's old rhetoric
used to suggest, but the content is precisely what the Freedom
Charter envisaged in 1955 and Mandela has consistently advocated.
The enthusiasm with which white South African businessmen have
embraced the ANC is often attributed to Nelson Mandela's personal
charm and statesmanlike sagacity. Sampson certainly fuels this
myth. He describes how, shortly after Mandela's release, British
Ambassador Robin Renwick took him to a fashionable restaurant
with some trepidation about the reaction of the wealthy businessmen
who were its usual clientele, "but Mandela made a point of
touring the dining-room, shaking hands and co-opting them to his
cause. 'It was a bravura performance.' said Renwick" (p.
412). Whatever Mandela's political skill, South African businessmen
had good reason to welcome him into their restaurants and to run
their government. They had extended their hands to him while he
was still in prison because he seemed to offer their only salvation
from economic disaster and social upheaval.
The changes that took place in the world economy during the
1980s had a powerful impact on the apartheid regime because the
South African economy was so isolated from the world market. The
National Party had created a highly regulated economy in which
30 percent of productive capacity was state-owned and high tariff
barriers protected industry from competition. This grossly inefficient
system seemed to be successful for short periods when the price
of gold was high, particularly in the 1960s, but had achieved
no real growth in GDP per capita since 1964. The apartheid system
imposed heavy financial burdens on business which had to support
a vast civil service and sustain the soaring cost of war in the
border states and domestic repression. Sanctions added to the
isolation at a time when capital was becoming increasingly mobile.
By the 1980s South African businessmen were pressing the government
to reach a settlement with the ANC. In 1985 Gavin Relly, chairman
of Anglo-American, the giant mining corporation, flew to Lusaka
in Zambia with a group of other leading businessmen to meet with
the ANC. Their impressions of the ANC leadership were favourable.
In the words of one of the businessmen, "A more attractive
and genial group it would be hard to imagine" (p. 340). Sampson
documents how the contacts continued. In 1986, the Rockefeller
Foundation, David Astor and Shell set up the South African Advanced
Education Project to prepare leading young ANC members for government
and business and Gold Fields, the company founded by Cecil Rhodes,
financed secret meetings between Afrikaner intellectuals and the
ANC at the Compleat Angler Hotel at Henley in Oxfordshire (pp.
362-63).
While the ANC was cultivating this close relationship with
big business the black working class were becoming more militant.
By the middle of 1985 the police could no longer control the townships
and the government declared a state of emergency. Foreign banks
and investors lost confidence in the Botha government's ability
to control the situation and pulled out their money. The ANC had
to struggle to put itself at the head of the movement that had
broken out largely independent of it. As so often in its history
this conservative organisation found itself tailing behind its
supposed followers. Its militant rhetoric was just that. The strategy
of armed struggle had, as Sampson notes, proved entirely ineffective.
Ultimately, it was not the ANC that forced the apartheid regime
to the negotiating table but the movement of the black working
class in the townships.
Mandela offered the South African capitalists their one chance
of controlling the black working class. When he was found to need
surgery for an enlarged prostate gland in 1985 the authorities
were terrified that he would die and that civil war would follow.
Mandela perfectly understood his vital role. In June 1986 when
the townships were besieged by armed police, and the Commonwealth
Eminent Persons Group had left in dismay after South Africa had
launched air strikes on neighbouring capitals, Mandela wrote to
General Willemse, the Commissioner of Prisons, whom he had known
as governor of Robben Island and demanded to see him "on
a matter of national importance" (p. 352). Willemse flew
to Pollsmoor, where Mandela was held, and arranged for him to
meet Kobie Coetsee, the Minister of Justice. Coetsee had made
a point of visiting Mandela in hospital after his operation the
previous year and had been impressed by him.
As the situation worsened, leading Afrikaners within the regime
like Coetsee and Niël Barnard, the head of the National Intelligence
Service, increasingly recognised that they could not defend apartheid
by military force and at the same time maintain a profitable environment
for business in South Africa. They turned to Mandela who offered
them the best prospect of protecting capitalist interests. Once
in office Mandela justified their hopes. Under his presidency
it has proved possible for South African capitalism to begin the
process bringing once protected industries into line with the
demands of the world market by cutting jobs and real wages without
provoking an uncontrollable mass movement. Mandela goes into retirement
having shown his worth as a bourgeois leader.
Much of Mandela's supposed radicalism was derived from his
connection with the Communist Party. This is one of the weakest
parts of Sampson's biography since he takes the Communist Party's
revolutionary credentials at face value. But his book makes it
possible to trace how that relationship developed. Before 1950
Mandela was actively hostile to the Communist Party. He had joined
the ANC when he came to Johannesburg in 1941. From its foundation
in 1912 the ANC had appealed to London for help against the white
regime in South Africa and had asserted the traditional authority
of the chiefs.
Mandela was himself from a chiefly background. He had been
educated to act as an adviser to the future Tembu king, but like
many other young men of his generation life in the town offered
a more powerful attraction than being even a prominent man in
a rural backwater. Under wartime conditions, with an increasing
demand for labour, the urban black population grew by 50 percent
from 1,142,00 in 1936 to 1,689,000 in 1946. In Johannesburg Mandela
met a young estate agent named Walter Sisulu who found him a job
as an articled clerk in a lawyer's office. Mandela and Sisulu
were among the group who set up an ANC Youth League in an attempt
to bring the organisation into line with the more militant movements
developing among urban blacks for whom tribal loyalties were of
diminishing significance.
The importance of the working class as a political force was
brought home to Mandela in 1950 when a May Day strike brought
out half of Johannesburg's black workers. Mandela and Sisulu found
themselves pinned down under police fire as security forces rampaged
through the black districts. Eighteen workers were killed. Mandela
later remembered, "That day was a turning point in my life
both in understanding through first hand experience the ruthlessness
of the police, and in being deeply impressed by the support African
workers had given to the May Day call." From that point on
Mandela moved closer to the Communist Party, although he had played
a prominent role in breaking up their meetings in the run-up to
the May Day strike.
By 1955 Rusty Bernstein, a member of the Communist Party, was
drafting the Freedom Charter. There was no anomaly in a supposed
communist drawing up a nationalist document which advocated the
creation of black capitalism. Since the 1920s when Stalin came
to power in the Soviet Union representing the interests of a privileged
bureaucratic layer, the Communist Party had developed a two-stage
theory of revolution that bore no relation to the conceptions
of Lenin or Trotsky, which had been the theoretical basis of the
Russian Revolution. According to this two-stage theory the first
objective was to achieve bourgeois democracy in South Africa and
only at an unspecified later date to go on to socialism. During
the 1950s the Stalinist parties turned increasingly to support
for national liberation struggles like the ANC as part of the
Cold War conflict with the imperialist countries. But they had
no intention of promoting socialist revolutions which would have
destabilised the position of the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union.
The association with the Communist Party made the ANC seem
far more left-wing than it really was, which proved invaluable
as the South African working class grew. By the 1970s the majority
of black South Africans had left the land and were workers. When
the South African economy went into recession in 1984, throwing
millions out of work, the growing unrest of the 1970s, which had
been manifested most sharply in the Soweto uprising of 1976, developed
into an insurrectionary movement. This movement took the ANC by
surprise. Had it not been for the Stalinists it would have been
more difficult for them to assert their leadership of it. They
used their positions in the trade union bureaucracy to keep workers
within the bounds of political protest sanctified by the churches
and liberal opponents of apartheid.
Sampson makes it clear that Mandela took a conscious decision
to look for alliance with the Communist Party rather than turning
to the Fourth International, which represented the genuine tradition
of the Russian Revolution. In 1948 Mandela met the South African
Trotskyist Isaac Tabata, who made a considerable impression on
him. Sampson writes, "Mandela was in some awe of Tabata:
'It was difficult for me to cope with his arguments.... I didn't
want to continue arguing with the fellow because he was demolishing
me just like that.' He was shocked that Tabata seemed more hostile
to the ANC than to the government. Afterwards Tabata wrote him
a very long letter, warning him against the 'collaborators' of
the ANC, and pressing him to base his actions on principles, to
'swim against the stream'" (p. 50). Although Mandela could
not, as he admits, answer Tabata's arguments, he instinctively
rejected the Trotskyists' call for the black workers to take the
lead in the struggle for national liberation on the basis of a
socialist programme.
For Sampson Mandela is a statesman who represents an entire
people regardless of class. Once this media created image is stripped
away the man that is left has still some justifiable measure of
claim to historical greatness, but not in an amorphous classless
sense. He rather emerges as a great figure among capitalist leaders,
standing head and shoulders above the run of modern politicians
because he comes from an earlier era. Mandela's education in mission
schools equipped him with a higher level of culture than is customary
among today's political leaders and he made good use of his time
in gaol to build on this foundation. The steadfastness which he
showed in prison further marks him out as a man of exceptional
personal qualities.
It was the good fortune of the capitalist class to have a man
of that calibre to save South African capitalism when it faced
insurrection. But even Mandela could not achieve stable conditions
for continued capitalist exploitation in South Africa as the world
economy becomes ever more disturbed. As world commodity prices
fall the mining industry has contracted creating 50 percent unemployment
among black workers. Added to that the government must destroy
30 percent of jobs in the public sector in the immediate future
even to maintain the present low levels of foreign investment.
The developing economic crisis is preparing the conditions for
a greater social explosion than that which shook the apartheid
regime. The capitalist class will need more than a Mandela to
extend the life of a system that is incapable of meeting the most
basic needs of the mass of the population.
See Also:
South Africa
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