|
WSWS : Correspondence
: Marxist
political economy
The speculative appreciation of the stock market: a reply
to a letter
By Nick Beams
30 August 1999
Use
this version to print
The following letter, written by WSWS Editorial Board
member Nick Beams, replies to a message from a reader. The message
is appended below.
Dear JPW,
The stock market is a market for the titles to property. You
are correct when you say that investment in shares does not add
to the constant and variable capital, except when the shares are
first issued to raise capital to start or expand a business. As
a title to property, the shares traded in the market represent
claims on the income (profit) generated by the business. When
a share changes hands in the market, no new capital has come into
the business. What has taken place is that the title to property
and thereby a share in the income has changed hands. The constant
and variable capital of the business remain the same as before.
If the market is continually rising, then, as you suggest,
both buyer and seller are able to make speculative gains on their
transactions, even though the underlying profitability of the
firm has not changed. But this process of accumulating fictitious
capital can continue only so long as money keeps flowing into
the market and pushes up share values.
However, there are limits to this process. Clearly the higher
the market goes, the greater will be the amount of money needed
to flow into it in order to maintain the same percentage increase
in share values. At a certain point the whole process must become
unsustainable.
Consider the escalation of Wall Street in the recent period.
Since US Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan issued
his famous warning about irrational exuberance at
the end of 1996, the Dow has gone from around 6500 to over 11,000
today. Clearly the US economy has not expanded at the same rate
over that period of time.
Where has the money come from? A large portion of the increase
is due to corporations borrowing money in order to buy back their
own shares and so increase their market value. One of the mechanisms
driving this process has been the issuing of stock options to
boards and CEOs as part of their salary packages. The operation
is extremely lucrative. The corporate boards decide to buy back
shares in order to boost shareholder value and the
corporate chiefs are able to exercise their stock options and
make a very handsome profit. The money to finance this process
comes from corporate borrowing. In other words, companies are
going further into debt in order to finance share buybacks which
boost the stock market and enable large speculative gains to be
made.
This process has intensified the concentration of wealth. An
article published in the August 4 edition of the Christian
Science Monitor noted that around 42,000 top corporate managerscomprising
0.00016 percent of the total US populationown a fifth of
the corporate wealth.
But the methods of financing the share market boom are creating
the conditions for extreme financial instability. In its August
6 edition the British magazine The Economist carried an
article on the impact of stock options and buybacks. It pointed
out that the cost of most executive share option schemes is not
fully reflected in company profit and loss accounts and noted
that attempts by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
to require firms to set the cost of options against profits
were killed by corporate lobbyists in 1995. They argued that if
the cost of option schemes were treated in that way, fewer of
them would be awarded, fewer people would have reason to maximise
shareholder value and the economy would suffer.
FASB did, however, manage to make firms include a footnote
in their accounts detailing the share options awarded during the
year. Smithers & Co., a research firm in London, calculated
the cost of these footnoted options and concluded that the American
companies granting them overstated their profits by as much as
half in the financial year ending in 1998. In some cases, particularly
that of high-tech firms (which tend to be generous with options),
the disparity is even greater. For instance, Microsoft, the world's
most valuable company, declared a profit of $4.5 billion in 1998;
when the cost of options awarded that year, plus the change in
the value of outstanding options, is deducted, the firm made a
loss of $18 billion, according to Smithers.
As the article noted there is some dispute over these figures.
But even if they are somewhat exaggerated, there is clearly developing
a situation of growing financial instability.
Other figures point in the same direction. For example in 1998,
firms announced repurchase of shares amounting to $220 billion
compared with $20 billion in 1991.
A related phenomenon is the growth of margin loans in which
investors use their existing stockholdings as collateral to borrow
more funds with which to finance share purchases. A recent publication
by the Financial Markets Center noted that the ratio of margin
debt to GDP is at its highest level in 60 years and that if the
average hourly wage in the US had been rising at the same rate
it would now be $60. Margin debt has risen more than three times
faster than household borrowing and overall credit market debt
since 1993 and has tripled in relation to GDP over the same period.
On the question of bonds issued by the state to finance schools,
highways, etc. In the final analysis money appropriated by the
state represents a deduction from the immediate mass of surplus
value available to be appropriated by capital in the form of profit,
if it is raised through taxes, and a deduction from the future
mass of surplus value if it is raised through loans.
Under conditions where the overall mass of surplus value is
expanding, as was the case in the post-war boom of the 1950s and
1960s, capital can tolerate a considerable degree of state activity.
Indeed, it welcomes such infrastructure projects as highways and
schools inasmuch as they bring about general economic development.
But in the conditions which now prevail, where the overall
mass of surplus value tends to stagnate or even decline, capital
becomes increasingly hostile to all state deductions. This is
why we have seen the running down of state infrastructure projects,
the demand of the privatisation of former state-run services and
their transformation into profit-making ventures, according to
the user pays principle, as well as cuts to state
spending on social welfare and education.
Yours sincerely,
Nick Beams
August 20, 1999
Dear Sirs:
Regarding the article Fictitious capital and the rise
of the Dow by Nick Beams (30 March 1999), I have a few questions.
(1) Share market trading is speculation ... one trader's loss
is another trader's gain. But if the market is constantly increasing
in value over the years both seller & buyer will benefit ...
the seller from the present transaction, the buyer from a future
one.
(2) Entitlement to a share of the profits expected to be generated
in the future: But if the share values are not used to add to
constant or variable capital by what right or theory are they
entitled to a claim on future profits?
(3) Bonds issued by the state: This example does not seem to
be clear with respect to fictitious capital. Doesn't the money
used through the issuance of bonds actually go toward capital
formation such as schools highways, etc.?
There are other questions I have but a clarification of the
above my help clear the others. This is not meant to be a critique
of your article but rather to gain a better understanding.
Respectfully,
JPW
See Also:
Other
letters on political economy
Fictitious capital and
the rise of the Dow
[30 March 1999]
Top of page
The WSWS invites your comments.
Copyright 1998-2008
World Socialist Web Site
All rights reserved |